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A JUDGE CAN DO NO WRONG:
IMMUNITY IS EXTENDED FOR LACK OF
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION -STUMP V. SPARKMAN
[T]he King himself is de jure to deliver justice to all his subjects;
and for this, that he himself cannot do it to all persons, he dele-
gates his power to his Judges,. . . and forasmuch as this concerns
the honour and conscience of the King, there is great reason that
the King himself shall take account of it, and no other. 1
Traditionally, the doctrine of judicial immunity has precluded indi-
viduals from maintaining civil actions against judges for injuries re-
sulting from a judicial proceeding. This tenet is thought to be in the
best interest of society, in that it allows a judicial officer "to be free to
act upon his own convictions without apprehension of personal con-
sequences to himself." 2  In reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, in Stump v. Sparkman,3 the Supreme Court
dangerously expanded the scope of this doctrine. 4 Specifically, the
Court found that a state judge's jurisdiction and ensuing immunity
shielded his approval of a mother's petition to sterilize her daughter.
As a result, the Court established that a judge is protected from per-
sonal liability unless consideration of the subject matter which caused
the injury was precisely foreclosed by law.
Problems immediately arise from this rationale. The most obvious
being that the Court is deferring to the state legislatures the duty of
amending their jurisdictional grant to their courts, a slow and often
1. Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1608).
2. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
3. 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978). One of the earliest American cases to consider judicial immunity
was Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810). In Yates, Chief Justice Kent found that a judge
of the New York Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to order a prisoner recommitted despite
another court's earlier grant of habeas corpus. The Chief Justice's rationale in holding the judge
free from the prisoner's liability action derived from an extended list of English cases which had
advocated the need for immunity in order to insure an uneffected and competent judiciary. Id.
at 289-98.
4. Few commentators have supported the need for a judicial immunity doctrine. See gen-
erally Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1936);
Thompson, Judicial Inmunity and the Protection of Justices, 21 MOD. L. REV. 517 (1958). More
recently, however, allegations of the doctrine's harshness have been advanced. See Kates, hn-
munity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65
NW. U.L. REV. 615 (1970); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of
State Officials to Civil Rights Damnage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941, 958 (1977). Note, hn-
munity of Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Inmunity? 27 CASE
W.L.REv. 717 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Qualified Immunity]; Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Liability of Judicial
Officers].
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fruitless process, so as to make judicial approval of matters which
deprive citizens of fundamental interests unlawful. Since the immun-
ity doctrine was judicially created, the Court itself should have taken
the initiative to limit the protection given to those judges who violate
an individual's basic rights.
After examining the evolution of the doctrine, this Note will chal-
lenge the present Court's application of judicial immunity. Secondly,
a more rational immunity standard will be advanced-one in which
society's interest in an efficient judiciary can be maintained while
awarding damages when fact situations similar to Stump arise.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
On July 9, 1971, Mrs. Ora Spitler McFarlin, the mother of plaintiff
Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, presented through counsel, a "Petition
to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor and Indemnity Agree-
ment" 5 to Judge Harold D. Stump of the Circuit Court of DeKalb
Actions for damages have been brought against judges based on a common law tort theory of
trespass against the person, including claims of: libel and slander: O'Bryan v. Chandler, 496
F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974) (federal judge immune from liabil-
ity for libelous statements and press releases); Roberson v. Harris, 393 F.2d 123 (Sth Cir. 1968)
(state court judge immune for publication of libelous court opinion); Garfield v. Palmieri, 297
F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962) (judge held immune for publication
of court opinion); malicious prosecution: O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S.926 (1966) (judge immune for giving false testimony to grand jury re-
garding plaintiff's activities); Branstead v. Schmidt, 324 F. Supp. 1232 (W. 1). Wis. 1971) (judge
immune from action alleging prejudice in criminal sentencing); false imprisonment: Potter v.
LaMunyon, 389 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1968) (judge held immune for ordering woman restricted
from visiting children).
Actions also have been based on deprivations of civil rights. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967). Judicial immunity has been unavailable, however, in those actions against
judges which seek injunctive relief. See Mitchunm v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Jacobson
v. Schaeffer, 441 F.2d 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1971).
Judicial immunity has also been extended to protect quasi-judicial officers, including court
clerks and prosecuting attorneys. See, e.g., Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972)
(clerk with ministerial duties held to be part of judicial process and thus immune); Yaselli v.
Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (special assistant to
attorney general immune from liability). But see McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.
1971) (court clerk held not entitled to absolute immunity for negligence-in duties).
5. 98 S. Ct. at 1102. The petition was prepared by Mrs. McFarlin's attorney, Warren G.
Sunday, later named a defendant in this case.
A tubal ligation, or sterilization, is a surgical operation in which the fallopian tubes are bound
or severed so as to prevent reproduction. The operation is known in medical terms as a sal-
pingectomy. See 2 J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 117 (1962). The op-
erations are usually irreversible. See Oster, Sterilized Daughter Seeks Justice, Chi. Sun Times,
October 30, 1977 at 8, col. 3 (statements made by defendant physician). These operations have
been referred to as a form of genocide. See R. SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW
100-11 (1965).
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County, Indiana.6  In the petition, Mrs. McFarlin stated that her
fifteen year old daughter was "somewhat retarded," although she had
attended public schools and progressed normally "along with other
children in her age level." 7  The mother also asserted that Linda had
left home on "several occasions" without permission, and had stayed
overnight with older youths or men. In view of this behavior, Mrs.
McFarlin believed sterilization was necessary to "prevent unfortunate
circumstances."
Before signing the petition Judge Stump made no effort to appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent the plaintiff's interests,8 nor did he
give her an opportunity to appear in court for a hearing on the mat-
ter.9 In fact, the child was never given notice, 10 and neither the
6. The circuit courts of Indiana are courts of superior an( general jurisdiction in both law
and equity cases. See Barkley v. Trapp, 87 Ind. 25 (1882). Judge Stump has been sitting on the
DeKalb County Circuit Court since 1959.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. In Whinnery v. Hammond Trust & Savings Bank, 80 hnd. App. 282, 140 N.E. 451
(1923), it was held that a court had the imperative duty to appoint a guardian ad liteoi in an
action concerning a child's interest in an estate. It would seem only logical then that a guardian
was necessary in this case. Other Courts which have dealt with the issue of sterilization have
automatically appointed a guardian. See In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (1974); Kemp. v. Kemp,
43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
9. The rights to notice and a hearing in an action which affects one's Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights were recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975). Bd. Regents v. Roth, 403 U.S. 564 (1972) and Carey v. Piphus, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978).
In these cases, the Court stated that the procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment will be invoked in cases where constitutional rights are violated. Procreation has
been interpreted as an element of the constitutional right to privacy. See Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1951). It should be noted, however, that these procedural cases were decided
after Linda Sparkman was sterilized.
10. According to Indiana rules, the circuit courts, which are courts of general and superior
jurisdiction, acquire "jurisdiction over a party or person who ... is served with summons or
enters an appearance, or who is subject to the power of the court under any other law." IN-
DIANA RULES OF TRIAL PROCEDURE, TR.4(A) (1970). Defendant Stump argues that he had
jurisdiction over Linda Sparkman through IND. CODE §§ 16-8-3-1, 16-8-4-2 (1971) which allow
for parents to consent to medical care for their children. Thus, Judge Stump argues jurisdiction
existed when Mrs. McFarlin consented to the operation by submitting her petition to the court.
See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8-9, Sparkman v.McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977). Plaintiffs argue, however, that this
method of acquiring jurisdiction is permitted only when necessary medical care is sought. See
Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at 7. Furthermore, service upon infants is required by an
Indiana law which specifically provides:
Service upon an individual known to be an infant shall be made upon his next of
friend or guardian ad litem, if service is with respect to the same action in which
the infant is so represented.
IND. TR.4.2(A) (1970).
In Indiana, the doe process right to notice for children was recognized at an early (late. See,
e.g., Martin v. Starr, 7 Ind. 224 (1855) (where process was required to be served on infant-de-
fendant in the same manner as adults). This demand for notice is also evident in applications to
the court for orders. See IND. TR..7(B) (1970).
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petition nor the approval was filed formally in the court. 11  After the
judge approved the petition, the child was taken to a local hospital
where she was told by doctors she was to undergo an appendec-
tomy.12 Not until fou r years later, after her marriage to Leo
Sparkman, did the couple discover the true nature of Linda's opera-
tion. 13 In 1975, the Sparkmans brought civil rights and common law
tort actions in federal court against Mrs. McFarlin, her attorney, the
doctors, the hospital, and Judge Stump.14
The United States District Court for the Northern District of In-
diana dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional counts for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.15 The court stated that
the only action proscribed by either the Fourteenth Amendment or
the civil rights acts 16 was the "state action" involved in Judge
11. The Indiana rules require that pleadings and other papers be properly filed with the
ctrts. See INo. TR. 5(E) (1970). In Pease v. State, 74 Id. App. 572 (1921), a court held that
courts have general jurisdiction, known as subject matter jurisdiction conferred on them by the
State's constitution or statutes, but that particular jurisdiction, that over the parties, necessitates
the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons. Furthermore, in Gilmour v. State, 230
Ind. 454 (1952), reheariug deted, 230 Ind. 454, 461 (1952), the Indiana Supreme Court held
that not only was subject matter jurisdiction requi red, but also jurisdiction over the particular
case. This can he accomplished only by complying with INI). TR. 7(B) (1970).
12. 98 S. Ct. at 1103. This cover-up was employed because Linda recently had been treated
for an attack of appendicitis by defendant Dr. Hines, See Sparkman v. M cFarlin, Civil No.
F75-129 (N.D. Ind . Mav 13, [976) (order of dismissal). The actual sterilization occurred on July
16, 1971, only seven days after Judge Stump had signed the petition.
13. Some of the doctors involved in the operation admitted to performing a sterilization,
while som e denied it, The Sparkmans were finally informed by Dr. Hines ili May of 1975 that it
tubal ligation had been performed. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civil No. F75-129 (N,D. Ind.
May 13, 1976) (order of dismissal).
14. The plaintiffs asserted a cause of action arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Jurisdiction was established under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970) which permit the federal courts original jnrisdiction in cases in-
volving both federal questions and those which allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970). The
Sparkmans also attached pendent state claims of assault, battery and medical malpractice. Leo
Sparkman individually asserted a pendent claiin of loss of potential fatherhood. Federal courts
are permitted to entertain non-federal causes of action when the division of federal and state
claims would cause plaintiffs burdensone and repeated litigation. See United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
15. Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civil No. F75-129 (N.D, Ihd. May 13, 1976) (order of dismissal).
The pendent state actions against the private defendants were also dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction as a result of the dismissal of the federal claims.
16. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XIV, Section 1, provides its part:
No State shall imake or enfiorce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
mllunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 'Within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Civil Rights Acts on which plaintiffs based their action are ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
isage, of anv State or Territory, slnhjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
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Stump's approval of the petition. Nevertheless, the court found that
no federal action could lie against any of the defendants because
Judge Stump, the only state agent, was absolutely immune from suit
under the doctrine of judicial immunity. On appeal, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, 17 concluding that Judge Stump was not acting within
his jurisdiction in approving the petition because Indiana law pro-
vided no authority for court-ordered sterilizations on the petition of a
parent. That court held that Judge Stump had, in fact, "acted ex-
trajudicially" 1 and that such action prevented the application of judi-
cial immunity as a defense. The Supreme Court, however, found this
ruling incorrect, stating, in sum, that the court of appeals employed
an "unduly restrictive view of the scope of Judge Stump's jurisdic-
tion."19 Writing for the majority in a five - three decision, Justice
White found that even if approval of the petition appears to be in
error, "Indiana law vested in Judge Stump the power to entertain and
act upon the petition for sterilization." 20
In separate dissents, Justices Stewart and Powell suggested that
society's interest, in addition to individual interests, might be better
served if the doctrine is viewed in light of a case's surrounding
circumstances, rather than merely applying the two considerations of
jurisdiction and judicial action as was. done by the majority. Yet to
fully appreciate the implications of the majority's rationale, an under-
standing of how the immunity doctrine developed is necessary.
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in e(uity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
ch. 22 § 2, Stat. 13, now 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1970) provides in part:
[]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therin do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspir-
acy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
17. Sparkman v. NicFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
18. Id. at 173. The com mon law rule and later cases have established that only actions taken
outside a judge's jurisdiction can subject him to personal liability. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
19. 98 S. Ct. at 1106.
20. Id. at 1108.
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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
English Development
The doctrine evolved at common law as a means of preserving a
strong and independent judicial system. 21 English courts theorized
that if judges were forced to defend their rulings against the adverse
reactions of litigants, the public as a whole would suffer from an in-
fluenced judiciary. Sir Edward Coke first emphasized this argument
in 1608 when he stated that judges were "to make an account to God
and the king" 2 2 only. To require that judges answer to the complaints
of litigants "would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice,
and those that are the most sincere would not be free fiom continual
calumnations." 23
While at common law there existed this strong public policy favor-
ing immunity, there has always been an available procedure for de-
feating the doctrine. The most common means has been to attack the
questioned judge's jurisdiction. If it is found that a judge. has the
prerequisite jurisdiction to rule on a particular subject matter, he will
be absolutely immune from an action for damages. 24 If, on the other
hand, it is found that a judge acted in absence of jurisdiction, the
door to liability is open.
Although superficially easy t o grasp, the concept of jurisdiction is
an extremely nebulous area of the law. According to the legal histo-
rian, William Holdsworth, a distinction in the degrees of jurisdiction
arose fior the fight for control of the English judiciary between the
common law courts of record, and those forums which did not main-
tain a record. 25 The courts of record were deemed courts of superior
21. See Taafe v. Downes, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (1815) (cases cited for the defendant). But cf.
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 110 (C.J. Cockburn disscnting)(disbelief that cases
allowing judicial liability will necessarily affect the judiciary). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 566 (1967) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
22. Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. 23, 25, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1608). In Floyd, an action of
conspiracy was brought against Judge Barker for having given judgment upon a verdict of death
for a defendant. In finding for Barker, Chief Justice Coke stated that record court judges could
not be drawn in question by the Star Chamber, a non-record court where the action had been
brought.
23. Id. One commentator has stated that continual calumnations, or vexatious suits, could
be controlled by implementing a qualified immunity which would allow suit upon a showing of
actual malice equivalent to the standard of proof in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); see Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 4, at 322.
24. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967).
25. As one of the leading judicial spokesmen of his time, Lord Coke led the political fight
for the supremacy of the common law courts of record by stating that these courts had the
exclusive jurisdictional authority to levy fines and to imprison offenders. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
1224 [Vol. 27:1219
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(general) jurisdiction because their judges had been vested by the
king with the power to independently determine the limits of their
own jurisdictional authority. A judge's erroneous conclusion as to his
limit of authority was characterized as merely in excess of, or an
abuse of jurisdiction, not an act outside his jurisdiction which could
subject him to liability. 26
In contrast, the courts of no record were regarded by the monarchy
as courts of inferior jurisdiction because their authority had been
limited expressly to encompass only particular places, people, or
subject matters. Consequently, an inferior court judge's error as to his
ambit of jurisdiction could result in action taken outside his authority,
thus subjecting him to probable liability.
However, in alleging a judge of general jurisdiction to be person-
ally liable, plaintiffs were required to meet an extreme burden of
proof. It had to be demonstrated that the superior court judge acted
without jurisdiction, 27 a difficult process at best since the reviewing
courts presumed that superior court judges could only act in excess of
their authority, and not outside their jurisdiction. This was believed
to have been the standard of proof until Stump.
American Development
The United States inherited this common law immunity theory
with the adoption of the English legal system. In 1868, the doctrine
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 159-60 (1924) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH]. Courts which
did not keep records were the Star Chamber, the Council, the Chancery courts while sitting in
equity, and the Admiralty courts, id. at 157-62. Since the new courts did not keep a record of
their proceedings, they were regarded by Coke as having no authority to impose such sanctions.
Later, in Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608), Chief Justice Coke took the
opportunity to eliminate the dispute between these two distinct legal factions and thus assure
the common law courts of their status as the duly authorized English forums. In an effort to
sanctiR, the records of the common law courts and consequently cripple the authority of the
competing courts, he stated that rulings of record-court judges could not be attacked in a com-
plaint brought before the non-record courts. This unique privilege, however, was not available
to the judges of the rival courts, whose unrecorded actions would remain open to attack.
Therefore, the basis of judicial immunity was merely the product of Coke's political maneuver-
ing, making the historical basis a tenuous foundation for the inflexible privilege that currently
shields our judges. 5 HOLDSWORTH at 159-60. Holdsworth claims, however, that prior to Coke's
theory, judicial immunity was non-existent, since actions which questioned the rationale of a
court's judgment took the form of a complaint against the judge. 6 HOLDSWORTH at 234-35.
Holdsworth states that the original method for appeal of an erroneous judicial decision was to
bring an action against the judge who rendered it. In the fourteenth century, however, com-
plaints against the judgment were differentiated from charges against the judge. See 1
HOLDSwORTH at 214; See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
665-67 (2d ed. 1898).
26. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25 at 238-39.
27. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1872).
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and its justifications first were examined by the Supreme Court in
Randall v. Brigham. 28 Justice Field, speaking for the Court, qual-
ified the doctrine in dictum by stating that judges of courts of
superior jurisdiction were not liable in civil actions, "unless perhaps
where the acts in excess of jurisdiction are done maliciously or cor-
ruptly."' 29  By implying that bad faith actions in excess of jurisdiction
could le a basis for judicial liability, Randall limited for the American
judge the immoderate immunity which protected English superior
court judges. The Randall theory of judicial immunity allowed courts
to resolve difficult questions of a judge's jurisdictional limits by letting
the courts make firther inquiry into the judge's motive or intent in
order to balance the good-faith of his actions against the individual's
competing interests.
Four years later, however, the Supreme Court reconsidered the
scope of the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher.30 In Bradley, an attorney
brought a common law tort action against a criminal court judge for
having ordered the plaintiff's name stricken from the roll of attorneys
eligible to practice in court. On the plaintiff's writ of error, the Su-
preme Court held that Judge Fisher's jurisdictional grant encompas-
sed the authority to ostracize Bradley fiom the criminal court bar. In
so holding, the Court introduced a rule which basically restored ab-
solute judicial immunity. The Court overruled, by implication, its dic-
tum in Randall by declaring that judges of courts of superior or gen-
era] jurisdiction would be immune even when their acts in excess of
jurisdiction were malicious (,)r corrupt.31 Again writing for the
majority, Justice Field did indicate, however, one exception to im-
munity. He distinguished actions which are in excess of jurisdiction
from those actions which are taken in clear absence of all subject
matter jurisdiction. As a model he stated that if a probate court
judge, vested only with authority over wills and estates, should try a
party for a public offense, it would be a usurpation of the judge's
authority, thus exposing him to an action for damages.3 2  But if a
28. 74 U.S. (7 \Vall.) 523 (1868). In Randall, a superior court judge removed an attorney
from the MIassachusetts bar because the attorney had allegedly given deceitful advice to a client.
The client's complaint to the court res lted in the at torinev's removal. The attorney con-
sequently brought an action for damages against the judge.
29. Id. at 536.
30. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). The plaintiff in Bradley represented John Suratt, who had
been accused of murdering Abraham Lincoln. After trial on July 2, 1867, the plaintiff allegedly
confronted Judge Fisher as he was leaving the bench and made derogatory remarks about the
Judge's handling of the case. Consequently, the Judge ordered Bradley dismissed fiom the
colurt's bar.
31. Id. at 351.
32. Id. at 352.
1226 [Vol. 27:1219
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judge of a criminal court vested with general criminal jurisdiction
should hold a particular act to be an offense, when in fact it is not,
and consequently convict a party for such act, or should sentence a
defendant to a greater punishment than is authorized by law, no per-
sonal liability would exist. Such action would only be in excess of
jurisdiction.33
Dissenters in Bradley, however, believed that the appropriate rule
to have been applied was the qualified immunity standard established
in Randall.3 4  Nevertheless, the Bradley holding reinstated what is
considered absolute immunity for superior court judges. The majority
removed virtually the only mode of checking a judge's action other
than through appeal. 35 In protecting malicious and corrupt judicial
conduct, and holding liable only those acts which are clearly outside
of jurisdiction, the Bradley Court let suits against judges turn on sub-
tle questions of jurisdictional interpretation. This standard makes it
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to obtain relief, especially in cases
such as Stunp, 36 where the jurisdiction of the defendant judge de-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 357 (Davis, J. dissenting).
35. The check on judicial action should be readily available to injured plaintiffs, not a bar-
rier which is based on keeping the bench desirable to qualified attorneys. See Jennings, Tort
Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271 (1936). The justifications which
Professor Jennings advanced in behalf of judicial immunity remain assumptions which appar-
ently the judiciary would rather not test. These justifications include: (1) suits against judges
would delay court proceedings; (2) prevention of possible influence on judicial determinations;
(3) capable men would be deterred from judicial service; (4) separation of powers between
federal and state governments; (5) a need for finality in litigation; (6) appeal of decisions as an
adequate remedy; (7) judges owe duty to public, not to individuals; (8) judges' need to protect
themselves; (9) unfair to have one decide the law and then penalize him for his opinion.
36. An alternative to suing judges in tort, and the theory on which the plaintiffs in Stump
rely, exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1871). See note 16 supra.
This section permits actions at law or suits in equity to be brought in the federal forum against
every person who, while acting under government authority, deprives individuals of their con-
stitutional rights. Notwithstanding the section's broad language, the Supreme Court's most re-
cent comment on judicial liability in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) implied that the
Bradley requirement of absence of jurisdiction was still a necessary prerequisite to proving
judicial liability even under Section 1983.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were intended
to vest private individuals with federally protected rights. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Fourteenth Amendment is. cited, in note 16 supra. U.S. CONST. amend. XV provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
These amendments, collectively known as the Reconstruction Amendments, were designed to
protect individuals from both private and state injury. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
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ments]. In furtherance of these amendments, Congress passed a series of supporting civil rights
acts which permitted federal courts to award damages to plaintiffs who were denied their new
constitutional guarantees, including: Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing South-
ern Black Codes); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat, 140 (protecting voting rights); Act of
Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 443 (protecting voting rights); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13 (suppressing the Ku Klux Klan); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in public accommodations). See Developments, supra. As a result of
these acts, the lower federal courts emerged above the state courts as the primary enforcers of
constitutional rights. At the time the Supreme Court was hearing Bradley, Congress was de-
liberating the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Because this Act's broad language made
ever), person liable for violating an individual's civil rights, legislators necessarily were con-
fronted by the question of whether judges also would be liable. Congressional debate shows,
however, that the Act was specifically directed against the inaction of southern courts and
judges in easing racial strife. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 172 (1871). Senator
Pool stated that, "[no Klan member ever] has feared any punishment for a crime committed in
pursuance of the order of the Klan..."; Senator Osborn stated that "[t]he State courts, mainly
under influence of the [Klan] oath, are utterly powerless." Id. at 653. These comments show
the legislature's concern for the freed slaves who were repeated victims of prejudice in the
courts. The 1871 Act is often referred to as the "Ku Klux Klan Act."
Representative Shellabarger, who drafted the Act, foresaw it as the civil model'of the Act of
1866, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), which had established
criminal penalties for all persons who violated an individual's rights. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong,, 1st Sess. (1871). Statements made in the 1866 debate strongly suggest that the doctrine
of absolute judicial immunity was abandoned because it "places officials above the law," and was
the "very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). The statements were made by Senator Trumbull
in the fight to overcome the judicial immunity doctrine which President Johnson supported.
Legislators were cognizant of the deprivation suffered by the freed slaves in courts of law, and
therefore enacted the bill as enforcement of the "Reconstruction Amendment" rights. Further-
more, Representive Lawrence stated:
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the State than permit it to
invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power per-
verted to such uses should be speedily invaded .... And if an officer shall inten-
tiondly deprive a citizen of a right, knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is
guilty of a willful wrong which deserves punishment.
Id. at 1837.
Although President Johnson vetoed the Act, pointing out to Congress problems involved in
subjecting a judge to criminal penalties, the veto was overridden and the Act approved. There-
fore, with judges exposed to the disgrace of criminal penalties, it should be presumed that the
civil liability called for in the Act of 1871 also was intended to include judges. Indeed, propo-
nents of the 1871 Act argued in debate that the courts often were under the control of "those
who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Rainey). Furthermore, it was believed that the
civil remedy provided by the Act was needed because of prejudicial judges and juries. Id. at
429.
Although the legislative intent of Section 1983 to include judges is evident, few actions based
on the statute were brought against judges. Doubt regarding Section 1983's applicability forced
litigants to sue judges on a tort theory, as was done iu Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th
Cir. 1932). In Manning, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a Kentucky state court
judge had acted in clear absence of his jurisdiction when he ordered a court spectator impris-
oned for relfusing to answer his questions. In honoring the jurisdictional rationale of Kentucky's
highest state court, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the judge was not performing a judicial func-
tion in asking questions of a person not involved at the trial at bar. The judge was deemed to
have assumed the role of grand jury and therefore was acting without jurisdiction.
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rives from a statutory grant giving his court the jurisdiction "to hear
all cases . . . whatsoever."
37
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Court's analysis in Stump was founded upon two major in-
quiries. First, the Court examined Indiana's jurisdictional grant to
the circuit court in order to determine whether Judge Stump's con-
sideration of the petition was within the lawful scope of his court's
jurisdiction. Secondly, the Court'examined and responded to plain-
In 1945, however, a federal appeals court specifically found judicial immunity invalid as a
defense to an action brought under Section 1983. In Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 151
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied 332 U.S. 776 (1947), a judge was named as a defendant for
denying a hearing for plaintiffs after their arrest in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Third Circuit dealt with the immunity issue of reasoning that "the
privilege as we have stated was a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to
wipe it out ...by enacting the Civil Rights Act. . and in fact did so." 151 F.2d at 250. Other
federal courts, however, did not immediately concur in this rationale. In fact, in 1966 the Third
Circuit was persuaded to overrule Picking in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966),
following the Supreme Court's holding in favor of legislative immunity in Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Finally, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the Section 1983 theory of judicial liability in
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A group of black and white clergymen were arrested and
convicted of violating a breach of the peace statute after attempting to use a "whites only"
section in a Mississippi bus terminal. After being acquitted of the criminal charges, the group
brought an action for damages under Section 1983 against the arresting officers and police
judge. On review, the Supreme Court discounted the belief that Section 1983 was intended to
include judges, and held that the common law doctrine of judicial immunity had not been
abolished by the civil rights acts.
The majority drew its rationale from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In that case
the Court had established immunnity for the official acts of state legislators by holding that
Congress could not have intended to impinge on a tradition of legislative privilege that was so
well grounded in history. Applying this simple logic to Pierson, Chief Justice Warren stated
that, "Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine [of
judicial immunity]." 386 U.S. at 555.
The sole dissent in Pierson was filed by Justice Douglas, who, instead of relying on common
law traditions, articulated the Congressional approach to the issue. Referring to the legislative
debate on Section 1983, he stated, "To most, 'every person' would mean every person, not
every person except judges." Id. at 559. He believed that a view which assumes that Congress
did not intend to change the common law is obviously contrary to the legislature's intent.
Douglas argued that the Court's consideration of judicial immunity should be based solely on a
statutory interpretation, which is not restricted to the common law view. Furthermore, he
stated that Congress enacts statutes to "remedy the inadequacies of the pre-existing law, in-
cluding common law." Id. at 561. Douglas concluded that the majority had ignored the clear
language of the statute an( the policy reasons behind it, and that doing so constituted not only
an erroneous interpretation but also a legislative act by the Court.
The Pierson decision does not abrogate the Bradley immunity holding. Instead, it extends it
because plaintiffs who bring a civil rights action against a judge Linder Section 1983 still must
show as in Bradley that the judge has acted in absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
37. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975).
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tiffs' argument that Judge Stump's consideration did not constitute a
protected "judicial act." The Court's rationale, however, signals that
in the future, defendant judges should be found by trial courts to be
within their jurisdiction unless they were foreclosed fiom considering
a subject matter by law. Furthermore, after Stump, this standard will
be required despite the most severe deprivations of individual rights.
Rather, the Court should have followed the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit.3 8 In that court's unanimous decision, Judge Luther
Swygert adopted the reasoning of various state courts, 39 all of which
had found judges lacking the jurisdiction necessary to order sterilization
absent specific statutory authority. Following this analysis, the Su-
preme Court should have then balanced the severity of the plaintiffs'
injury against society's interest in similar judicial behavior.
Jurisdiction
Initially, the Supreme Court's analysis of jurisdiction relied solely
on Bradley v. Fisher. 40 Bradley established two critieria for presid-
ing judges to consider when in judgment of their brethren. First,
that it is of the highest importance to the proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer be free. 41  Secondly, Justice Field's
38. Stump v. Sparkman, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. See Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969). In Frazier, a guardian's
application to a probate court for a sterilization was held to be outside the court's jurisdiction.
Moreover, the coinrt stated that the application was based oin social and economic grounds, not
on medical necessity. Id. at 393. See Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
In Holmes, a county health officer sought a sterilization for a 34 year-old woman who had
already given birth to two illegitimate retarded children. The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's holding that no legal authority to grant such relief exists. The appellate court implied
that legal committees, and not the courts, should oversee such matters.
It was argued before the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court that Judge Stump hail
jurisdiction according to A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 50 (hnd. App. Ct. 1975). In A.L., a
mother sought a declaration of her right to have her son sterilized under the common law rules
of parent-child relation. The Indiana appellate court held that common law does not invest such
power ili parents. In Stfunip, at tle Seventh Circuit level, plaintiffs contended that because the
appellate coirt heard the case and did not touch upon the issue of whether courts were the
proper forum for considering sterilizatiofs, it was to be implied that the courts had such juris-
diction. The Seventh Circuit, however, foind that no such inference could be drawn from A.L.
"Aside from the fact that A.L. was decided after Judge Stump acted, it undercuts rather than
supports his position." 552 F.2d at 175. Furthermore, the action in A.L. was a full adversary
proceeding ts opposed to the facts in the present case where neither notice nor a hearing were
given, thereby raising tile presumption that Judge Stuip knew he did not have the jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court did not, however, accept this argument. 98 S. Ct. at 1106.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
41. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
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model of jurisdiction is to be considered the only standard by which a
court can pass on a judge's limits.
Total reliance on Bradley, however, is unwarranted for several
reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the qualified immunity the Su-
preme Court recently has allowed other governmental officials. For
example, in Wood v. Strickland,42 the Court found that school offi-
cials were to be given only a qualified immunity, if in expelling stu-
dents, they "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
[they] took within [their] sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the student -affected .. ."43 Essentially,
the test was whether the officials acted in good faith. Furthermore, in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 44 the Court held that the Governor of Ohio and
other state officials were not absolutely immune from liability, but
were entitled immunity qualified by the circumstances and by
whether they acted in good faith.
In both cases the Court looked extensively to common law tradition
and public policy as was done in Bradley. What is difficult to recon-
cile, however, is why the Governor of Ohio, considering the cir-
cumstances surrounding the Kent State University riots, is allowed
only a qualified immunity for ordering troops to shoot at students,
while an Indiana county court judge is bestowed with absolute im-
munity for ordering a young woman sterilized. The public policy con-
sideration, that of protecting the official, indeed was more pressing in
Scheuer, where there was an "obvious need for prompt action, and
decisions. . . made in reliance on factual information supplied by
others." 45 In comparison, Mrs. McFarlin's petition was not pressing.
Nor can it be said that Judge Stump would have been justified in
relying only on the information supplied to him by Mrs. McFarlin's
attorney, since a hearing was in order where the child would have
been present or represented by counsel.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court began its analysis of jurisdiction
as the Seventh Circuit had, by examining Indiana's statutory grant to
the circuit court, a law which gives Judge Stump "original exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity whatsoever. "4 The
42. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
43. Id. at 322.
44. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
45. Id. at 246.
46. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975) provides:
jurisdiction. Said court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law
and in equity whatsoever, and in criminal cases and actions for divorce, except
where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is, or may be conferred by law upon
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statute also provides circuit court judges with jurisdiction over "all
other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive juridiction
thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or of-
ficer." 47  In light of this grant, the Supreme Court concluded simply
that Judge Stump had the requisite authority to consider the steriliza-
tion petition, even if, as the district court had found, Judge Stump's
"approval" in retrospect appears to have been premised on an er-
roneous view of the law.4 s  The Court, however, entirely ignored
addressing what this "erroneous view of the law" was, and instead,
found that under the Indiana jurisdictional statute, the Bradley man-
date of an absence of all jurisdiction was not clearly evident.
At the appellate level, the Seventh Circuit had found this broad
statutory grant could not cloak an Indiana judge with blanket immun-
ity. Stating that a claim must have a statutory or common law
basis 50 to justify immunity, the Seventh Circuit found that the sole
Indiana sterilization statute authorized only the governing boards of
institutional hospitals to approve these operations. 51 Consequently,
the court of appeals reasoned that the final portion of Indiana's juris-
justices of the peace. It shall also have exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of
decedents' estates and of guardianships: Provided, however, That in counties in
which criminal or superior courts exist or may be organized, nothing in this section
shall be construed to deprive such courts of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by
laws, and it shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law, and it
shall have jurisdiction of all other causes, matters, and proceedings where exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or officer.
(emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civil No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976) (order of dismis-
sal).
49. 98 S. Ct. at 1105.
50. 552 F.2d at 174.
51. IND. CODE § 16-13-13-1 (Repealed by Acts 1974 P.L. 60 § 1). The Sterilization of Pa-
tients Act of 1927 originally provided:
Authorization. Whenever the superintendent of any hospital or other institution of
this state, or of any county in this state, which has the care or custody of insane,
feeble-minded or epileptic persons, shall be of the opinion that it is for the best
interests of the patient and of society that any inmate of the institution under his
care should be sexually sterilized, such superintendent, if a lawfully licensed physi-
cian and surgeon, is hereby authorized to perform, or cause to be performed by
some capable physician or surgeon, an operation or treatment of sterilization on any
such patient confined in such institution afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity
that are recurrent, epilepsy, or incurable primary or secondary types of feeble-
mindedness: Provided. That such superintendent shall have first complied with the
requirements of this act. . ..
Sections 16-13-13-2 to 16-13-13-6 of the statute provide the due process procedures to be fol-




dictional statute - "where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not confer-
red by law upon some other court, board or officer," 52 was in effect.
Since another board had jurisdiction over the subject matter, Judge
Stump was deemed to lack the proper authority.
In its own analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged the excessive
breadth of the State's jurisdictional statute, and its failure to itemize
what subject matters were included. Yet the Court ignored the care-
ful restrictions of the sterilization statute, finding instead it "more
significant that there was no Indiana law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit
court,. . . from considering a petition of the type presented to Judge
Stump." 53
The Court reasoned that even if the sterilization statute precludes
original judicial approval, parents have the underlying authority, ac-
cording to a general medical statute, to "consent to and contract for
medical or hospital care or treatment of [the minor] including
surgery."54 Reliance on this statute, however, is entirely mistaken.
For then, as Justice Stewart was told by petitioner's counsel during
oral arguments, Judge Stump would have had jurisdiction to order
the child's hands amputated had Mrs. McFarlin pleaded her daughter
was inflicted with kleptomania. 55 Indiana's general medical care stat-
ute was not intended to authorize parents' requests for unnecessary
surgery. Rather, this statute was presumably intended to establish
limitations on hospital and physician liability involving the care of
minors. 56
The court's reliance on Bradley is unwarranted for further
reasons. Justice Field's model of jurisdictional limitation does not deal
with superior court judges and, therefore, should not be totally con-
trolling. His example of a clear absence of jurisdiction depicted a
probate court judge, a court statutorily limited in its jurisdiction,
hearing a criminal matter. 57 The absence of authority is clear for
there have been cases where a limited court judge has been found
liable for ordering sterilization. 58  What is equally apparent in Brad-
52. See note 45 supra.
53. 98 S. Ct. at 1105.
54. IND. CODE § 16-8-4-2 (1973).
55. This question was asked of Judge Stump's counsel during oral argument. Stump v.
Sparkman (No. 76-1750) (argued Jan. 10, 1978).
56. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 § 18.2 (1975) which is worded similar to the Indiana
law. The Illinois statute has been interpreted as requiring consent by a parent as a protective
measure against third-party liability.
57. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352.
58. See Wade v. Bethesda Hosp. 337 F. Supp. 671, rehearing 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio
1971, 1973). In Wade, an action was brought under Section 1983 against an Ohio probate judge
who had ordered the sterilization of a 17 year-old girl. An order was rendered denying the
1978] 1233
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1219
ley, however, is that Justice Field did not indicate how to determine
when a superior court judge acts in clear absence of jurisdiction.
Since, as Justice White indicated, Indiana's general jurisdictional
grant to the circuit court is not itemized, 59 there is no exact way of
telling, as in Justice Field's example, when an Indiana superior court
judge has acted beyond his authority.
Consequently, the correct analysis called for the Court to examine
the subject matter considered by Judge Stump and determine
whether, on its face, it was an appropriate subject for judicial ap-
proval. 60 The Court, however, took no initiative to explore the sub-
ject matter and instead relied on the Indiana legislature's lack of
specificity in the jurisdictional statute. As a result, the Court did not
have to discuss the trauma surrounding involuntary sterilization nor
the public's scant interest in a protected judiciary in circumstances
such as these.
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The judge had claimed immunity on the grounds
that his action catte within his jurisdictional grant.
This particular judge had also ordered the sterilization of a young girl in In re Simpson, 180
N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Prob. 1962). At that time, the judge based his action on an Ohio statute
which provided that when mental institutions wvere overcrowded, a probate judge could take
such action as he deemed necessary for the health and welfitre of the feeble-minded. In Vade,
the judge based his action on Oiiio REV. Col)I: ANN. § 2101.24 which provides:
The probate court shall have plenary power at law and in equity filly to dispose of
any matter properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise li-
mited or denied by statute.
59. 98 S. Ct. at 1105.
60. The Supreme Court has come to regard procreation as a fundamental right through a
series of cases. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). These cases arose out of arguments for rights of
personal privacy. While there may be no right of privacy found in the Constitution, the Court
has recognized the creation of "zones of privacy"' which arise fiom specific guarantees, thereby
limiting government interference. In Roe, the Court limited these protected zones to include
only those rights of personal privacy which Justice Cardozo defined in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) as "fnidamental" or "implicit in the concel)t of ordered liberty." In Palko, the
Fifth Amendment, which precludes double jeopardy in criminal proceedings, was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state proceedings. Jostice Cardozo held the
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment to be so fundamental to an ordered scheme of liberty that
its application to the states was imperative. In relation to Sparkman, certain privacy rights,
particularly procreation, are also regarded as fidamental to an ordered society. Consequently,
the interest in a sterilization must outweigh the interference it inflicts on the ordered scheme of
liberty.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1951), a state sterilization statute w"as held un-
constitutional on equal protection grounds. In the process, Justice Douglas stated that procre-
ation was "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. Con-
sequently, a violation of the right to bear children is permissible only when a compelling state
interest il the prevention exists. Certainly, neither the social nor the economic interests held
by Linda's mother or the state of Indiana were sufficiently compelling to warranit Judge Stump's
order. Because the right to bear children is i fundamental right, the Supreme Court should
have found that this case to Ibe a valid Section 1983 action.
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A striking contrast to the Supreme Court's lack of subject matter
analysis is to be found in In re Application of A.D. 61 A New York
court was requested by a mother to authorize the sterilization of her
sixteen year-old mentally retarded daughter. Unlike Stump, the peti-
tion in this case was accompanied by a physician's letter which al-
leged that despite the girl's age, her mental retardation caused her to
function below a five year-old level. Furthermore, a report filed by
the guardian ad litem, appointed to protect the girl's interests,
suggested that the girl would be unable to care for a child in the
event she were to become pregnant. Despite these reports, the court
denied the petition because it found that "in the absence of specific
statutory authority, the courts lack jurisdiction to make this funda-
mental change." 62  The Supreme Court should have adopted this
rationale in Stump and made it their duty to define the limits of
jurisdiction for the Indiana circuit courts when considering a steriliza-
tion issue.
Judicial Acts
The second major inquiry involved in the Supreme Court's
rationale centered on the characterization of Judge Stump's acts. Al-
though Bradley speaks primarily of a jurisdictional analysis, a tangen-
tial argument for defeating immunity is available. Plaintiffs must
prove that a judge's actions were not "judicial acts" and thus again
were outside his jurisdiction.
The Sparkmans made this secondary argument by contending that
Judge Stump's lack of formality in considering the petition made his
acts less than judicial. 63 Specifically, they claimed that because the
petition was not given a docket number, was not placed on file with
the clerk's office, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding without
notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment
of a guardian ad litern, the Judge's acts lacked judicial authority. 64
The Court dismissed this argument by purporting to apply the
rationale of two cases.6 5  In stating that it "has not had occasion to
61. 394 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1977).
62. Id. at 140.
63. Brief for Respondent at 21-23, Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978).
64. Id. at 20.
65. 98 S.Ct. at 1107. The second case which the Court discussed was McAlester v. Brown,
469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972). In McAlester, a judge was found immune for ordering the
parents of an imprisoned youngster arrested when they came to the judge's chambers seeking
permission to give their son fresh clothes. This case will not be considered in this Note because
it stands for the proposition that the judge had authority to order the imprisonment when he
was approached in his official capacity. Respondents concede that Judge Stump was approached
in his official capacity. They contend rather that the manner in which he handled the ptition
was nonjudicial. Brtef of Respondents, at 20-23, Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
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consider, for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine, the neces-
sary attributes of a judicial act," 66 the Court did find, however, the
rationale of In re Summers67 to be controlling. In Summers it was
claimed that a lack of formality prevented the consideration of a
petitioner's application to the Illinois Bar from being a judicial pro-
ceeding. Specifically, the Character and Fitness Committee had
found an applicant unacceptable because of his position as a conscien-
tious objector. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained the Committee's
finding. Subsequently, the applicant petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for review of the Illinois Supreme Court's denial,
which petitioner alleged was in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In response to petitioner's allegations, the Illinois Supreme
Court contended that no case or controversy had been presented
which the United States Supreme Court could review. The grounds
for this contention was that the state court's review was not a formal
judicial proceeding. The United States Supreme Court found, how-
ever, the state court's argument erroneous because the Illinous court
had ruled on the merits of the Committee's applicant report, thus
making the Illinois court's action a judicial proceeding.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Stump. Plaintiffs in Stump
did not contend that there had been no case or controversy presented
to the judge as was done in Summers. This claim had been alleged in
Summers so as to prevent review. Respondents in Stump contended
that the more applicable case which dealt with judicial acts was Ex
parte Virginia.68 In Virginia, a county court judge was indicted and
66. 98 S. Ct. at 1106-07.
67. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
68. 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Although this case did not involve a civil action against a judge, the
Supreme Court did describe a judge's actions as being protected only when they are discretion-
ary or decision-making actions, not ministerial or administrative actions. This fact is, however,
that no action taken by a judge is totally free from the decision-making process. The petitioner,
Judge Coles, insisted that his selection of jurors was an official judicial act and thus privileged.
The Supreme Court, however, stated that selecting jurors was "surely not a judicial act.'" Id. at
348. Cf. Shore v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (holding that a judicial officer is
not immune from civil action for acts which may be characterized as ministerial); Penn v.
Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (judge on state jury board may be subject to
liability for administrative acts taken in that capacity). But see Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1970) (judge presiding over "Fiscal Court" possibly immune).
An example of the immunity given those officials who- use discretion in their duties is found
in Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). In Barr, officials of the Office of Rent Stabilization
brought a libel action against the office's acting director. The director had issued a press release
which condemned the officers' performance of their duties, and further announced his intention
to fire them. In examining the policy-making or discretionary function of a government official,
Justice Harlan stated that the absolute privilege of immunity for officials who perform these
functions is needed for the protection of the public interest. This interest includes freedom from
vindidtive or ill-founded suits. °
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later held in custody for excluding blacks from jury service in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875.69 In the judge's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, he argued that Congress could not
have intended to punish a state court judge through the Fourteenth
Amendment for his official acts. In disposing of this argument and
thereby denying the petition, the Court found that the selection of
jurors was not a judicial act, but rather a ministerial role which might
well have been committed to a private person. In Indiana, approval
of sterilization petitions was specifically granted to the administrative
boards of hospitals, not judges. 70
In Stump, the Court regarded Sumnwrs as establishing the factors
to determine whether an act by a judge is a judicial action or a non-
judicial one. If the act is a function normally performed by a judge
and to the expectation of the parties, or if the parties dealt with the
judge in his official capacity, 71 the judge's actions will be deemed
judicial and consequently immune. However, these factors are in-
applicable in Stump. It is obvious that Mrs. McFarlin approached
Judge Stump in his official capacity for approval of the petition. As
Justice Stewart indignantly stated, however, "false illusions as to a
Justice Harlan drew his reasoning from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gregorie v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). In Gregorie, a plaintiff brought false imprisonment and civil
rights claims against a district attorney and an immigration officer, who had ordered the plaintiff
detained as an enemy alien. Judge Hand stated that the officers possessed absolute immunity
based on the public good, although he conceded that officials might act dishonestly on occasion.
177 F.2d at 581.
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to discuss the "discretionary function" was Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). There, the action was directed against a postmaster general for
having distributed false information about the plaintiff. The Court stated at that time that, "it
would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs. . . [of] the gov-
ernment, if he were subjected to any such restraint." 161 U.S. at 498.
Recent cases, however, indicate a move toward making various governmental officials in-
creasingly liable for their actions. The standard of immunity being applied requires a careful
inquiry into the nature of the alleged wrongful acts and scope of the accused official's duties.
See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 305 (1973) (action against House Committee and its employees
for disseminating libelous information). Although this new immunity test has affected only
executive and administrative officers, the trend indicates the Supreme Court's willingness to
examine the discretionary roles of some officials. Obviously judges and legislators are not the
only officials who perform discretionary functions, yet their immunity has remained excessive.
Such unequal protection for officials could affect the delicate balance in the separation of powers
between branches. A detailed survey of the doctrine's status prior to Bradley, however, dis-
closes that several states believed that a qualified immunity was the proper standard to apply to
judicial actions. See Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 4, at 327 n.30, 31. Non-judicial
action may not be simply classified as action taken outside of jurisdiction. 0
69. Ch. 14 § 4, 18 Stat. 335, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948). This statute prohibits the
states from preventing individuals from serving on juries because of racial standards.
70. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
71. 98 S. Ct. at 1107. In making this statement, Justice White footnotes the Court's dispute
with Justice Stewart. Justice White believes what Judge Stump performed was a normal func-
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judge's power can hardly convert a judge's response to those illusions
into judicial acts." 72 As to the first assumption, parents normally do
not petition courts for approval of medical care for their children.
Only under unusual circumstances are the courts turned to,'and
surely it was not common for Judge Stump to encounter petitions for
sterilization.
THE TRIPARTITE IMMUNITY TEST
Judicial efficiency and integrity represent society's goals in im-
mnnizing judges from liability for their actions. But as are most of
society's goals, they must be balanced against competing interests. In
his dissenting opinion, 73 Justice Stewart's analysis of judicial acts im-
plies that the interest in an independent judiciary should be viewed
in light of a particular case's surrounding circumstances. 74 In a sepa-
rate dissent, Justice Powell took this analysis one step further. 75 He
believed the central feature of Stump was the preclusion of any possi-
ble vindication of Linda Sparkman's rights elsewhere in the judicial
system. 76  Furthermore, Justice Powell found that both the Bradley
and Pierson Courts recognized that society's interest in an indepen-
dent judiciary was maintained at the expense of individual rights.
Consequently, he believed that underlying the notion that private
rights may be sacrificed for the achievement of a greater public good
through immunity, is the existence of alternative means for vindicat-
ing those rights. 77  Judge Stump acted in a manner that prohibited
access to all other judicial remedies, namely appeal. Therefore, Jus-
tice Powell found the Bradley doctrine inoperative in this case.
In light of Justice Powell's dissent, a new determinative factor for
judicial immunity cases should be implemented. Aside fiom analyzing
the jurisdiction of the judge in question and the character of his acts,
a case's surrounding circumstances should also be analyzed. Of prim-
ary importance is whether the right to appeal or alternative remedial
measures were prohibited. If it cannot be clearly determined that a
judge was within his jurisdiction or that his acts were non-judicial,
but it does appear that an appeal was disallowed or not made possible
before injury, immunity should be withheld.
tion. Giving approvals is a normal function for Indiana superior court judges. There is no deny-
ing, however, that judges do not normally approve sterilization petitions brought by parents.
72. 98 S. Ct. at 1110.
73. 98 S. Ct. at 1109.
74. Id. at b109-11.
75. Id. at 1111.
76. Id.
77. 1d. Justice Powell's reasoning for checking judicial actions is the most logical. His for-
mula honors both the need for immunity and the need for a check of the power in the hands of
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Society's interest in a tripartite immunity test is obvious. Although
the nation needs an efficient judiciary, it also needs to protect the
individual rights upon which the nation was founded. When an indi-
vidual is deprived of those rights by the judiciary, and the opportun-
ity to correct that deprivation through the system is denied, the
judiciary must account for its mistake to society. Furthermore, a
tripartite test should pose no threat to judges when considering criti-
cal matters such as temporary restraining orders or injunctions, situa-
tions in which a judge's order is complied with often before an appeal
can be made. The test should only be applied in cases where judges
have violated a citizen's fundamental rights. Not only must a judge's
preclusion of appeal be considered, but also the original Bradley
analysis of whether the judge had jurisdiction to act must be made.
In temporary restraining orders and injunctions, the issue of jurisdic-
tion is resolved usually when the motion is considered. The two re-
maining legs of the tripartite test should be applied only in cases
where it does not clearly appear that a judge acted without jurisdic-
tion.
CONCLUSION
In Stump, the Supreme Court gave immunity to a superior court
judge for not having known the limits of his authority, but who was
approached, nevertheless, in his official capacity. This particular def-
erence to state authority is a dangerous precedent. State legislatures
grant jurisdiction to superior courts in sweeping statutes. Stump has
taught us that deprivation of fundamental rights may easily result
from such broad grants. Consequently, unless the subject matters of jur-
isdiction are itemized for superior courts as they are for inferior courts,
state judges will not have to answer in federal court to civil rights
actions. The Supreme Court should have been prepared to force
Judge Stump to answer for his actions. Unfortunately, the Court
failed the public, believing in the long run the common good of soci-
ety is better served if judges are firmly established above the law. No
court, however, should be empowered to place restrictions on the
right to bear children. Such limitations should be carefully delineated
by the legislature and not the judiciary. 78 The Supreme Court
should have honored this separation of power and accordingly found
that Judge Stump acted outside his jurisdiction.
Stephen Craig Voris
a few. The tripartite immunity test for judges sets Justice Powell's reasoning into a workable
standard for future courts to apply.
78. See In re Application of A.D., 394 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1977).
1978] 1239

